How Xi Reshaped China's Central Asia Ties -- By The Numbers

RFE
12 Jun 2026, 14:49 GMT+10

When Xi Jinping was appointed general-secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2012 and later as president in 2013, China was emerging as an important trade partner for Central Asia with unclear ambitions toward a region traditionally under the influence of Russia.

But data compiled by RFE/RL shows how Xi's tenure as China's leader has led to a wave of wide-ranging diplomatic engagement that has helped transform Beijing's role from influential neighbor into Central Asia's most consequential economic partner -- a relationship that could reshape the future of the region.

RFE/RL's findings show that Xi has made 15 visits to Central Asia since 2013, the most by any Chinese leader.

"Under Xi Jinping, Central Asia has shifted from being viewed primarily as a buffer region on China's border to becoming a core strategic corridor linking China to Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe," Bradley Jardine, managing director of the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs and co-author of the book Backlash: China's Struggle for Influence in Central Asia, told RFE/RL. "Xi sees Central Asia as strategically indispensable."

Map: Xi's Visits To Central Asia

This period has also coincided with 34 bilateral visits over 13 years from the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to China.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan lead the count at eight visits each, followed closely by Tajikistan at seven. On top of that, China and Central Asia have engaged through annual summits like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the China-Central Asia Summit, which launched in 2023 as the first official gathering between Beijing and the region that didn't also include Russia.

Over the course of the Xi era, top-level engagement has been steady, but at times uneven. China's leader didn't leave the country and only held virtual and phone meetings from 2020 to 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He broke his international isolation in September 2022 with a state visit to Kazakhstan followed by the SCO summit held that year in Uzbekistan.

Chart: Central Asian Presidential Visits To China, 2013-2026

A New Form Of Chinese Engagement

RFE/RL's data highlights not only that diplomatic engagement with Central Asia has expanded under Xi but that it has also deepened across all levels.

Wang Yi, who was appointed China's foreign minister in 2013 and held the role since then apart for a brief period from January to July 2023, has maintained regular contact with Central Asian leaders and top officials, with some form of high-level meeting with the region taking place every year from 2013 to 2026.

Chart: Foreign Minister Wang Yi's Engagement With Central Asia

Xi's tenure has also seen growing engagement between government officials and businesses from China's western Xinjiang Province. Xinjiang borders Central Asia and has deep historic connections, which also made it a source of contention following Beijing's crackdown launched in 2017 that led to more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim minorities being put into mass detention camps.

Despite backlash among local populations in Central Asia, RFE/RL's dataset shows a sustained surge in Xinjiang-level engagement from local officials from 2023 onward, with 17 visits in 2023, 20 in 2024, and at least 10 in 2025.

The Xi Era Goes Live

Xi built on the efforts of his predecessors and soon made Central Asia a priority.

In 2013, he visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and while in Astana during his first year in office he unveiled the overland component of what would later be called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the globe-spanning project that opened the door for Chinese companies and helped reorient much of the economic gravity of Eurasia toward China.

The underpinning of the foreign policy initiative became a hallmark of Xi's leadership, but Chinese policymakers had it in the works for years. In 2012, Wang Jisi, an influential scholar and former dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, outlined a strategy for a massive economic and diplomatic push westward across Central Asia to build influence in Eurasia. Dubbed "March West," the strategy was a response to US plans to rebalance toward East Asia, and many of its ideas formed the foundation for the BRI.

Chart: Types Of Visits By Xi To Central Asia, 2013-2026

The initiative was part grand strategy and part opportunistic response to the reality on the ground.

China managed to weather the 2008 global financial crisis better than most countries but emerged facing overcapacity issues for many of its industries and needing access to new markets. Moreover, as China overtook Japan in 2010 as the world's second-largest economy, many countries across Eurasia were eager to attract investment and had limited access from the West or Russia.

"China has really upped their game and their image across the board in all five Central Asian countries, and I believe that has been a considered policy under Xi Jinping," George Krol, who served as US ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2011-2014 and to Kazakhstan from 2015-2018, told RFE/RL.

More Than Just Top-Level Engagement

While the launch of the BRI helped characterize an era of growing Chinese influence and business footprint under Xi, another hallmark is the growing role of Xinjiang in diplomatic engagement with Central Asia.

"Xinjiang is no longer simply a frontier region in Chinese foreign policy. It increasingly functions as a diplomatic and logistical hub for China's engagement with Central Asia," said Jardine. "Beijing is using Xinjiang as a platform for trade integration, border management, infrastructure connectivity, and increasingly political coordination with neighboring states."